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Eklund: The Death Penalty in Montana

COMMENT

THE DEATH PENALTY IN MONTANA:
A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
Amanda K. Eklund*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Capital punishment is a direct affront to human dignity, a
basic constitutional right guaranteed to Montana citizens. The
psychological effects of knowing one's death is imminentwhether it comes in a matter of weeks, days, or hours-are cruel
and degrading. Further, evidence of racial disparities in the
application of the death penalty demonstrates the practice
directly contradicts respect for human worth. The death penalty
violates the bodily integrity of its victims when it denies inmates
the vital choice to determine what happens to their own bodies.
The United States has been internationally criticized for its
failure to recognize the indignity of the death penalty.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law, 2004. The author thanks
her father, Tom Alton, and Constitutional Law professor Mark Kende for their helpful
suggestions and editorial expertise.
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II. MONTANA'S DIGNITY PROVISION
In its Declaration of Rights, the Montana State Constitution
specifically provides for every Montana citizen's right to human
dignity.1 Article II, Section 4 states: "The dignity of the human
being is inviolable."2 Despite its strong language and prominent
place in the Declaration of Rights, the Dignity Clause has only
recently been relied upon by the Montana Supreme Court as a
sole basis for an appellate opinion. Prior to this year, only two
justices had partially based opinions on the individual right to
dignity. 3 In its Article II, Section 4 decisions the Court has
primarily focused on the equal protection language following the
dignity provision, specifically that "[n]o person shall be denied
4
the equal protection of the law."
The 1972 Constitutional Convention transcripts reveal little
about the delegates' intent as to the dignity provision. The only
specific references to human dignity appear in Delegate Wade
Dahood's commentary supporting the proposed provision. 5 Yet
Dahood's comments deal more with discrimination, and not the
general concept of human dignity: "[T]he intent of Section 4 is
simply to provide that every individual in the State of Montana,
as a citizen of this state, may pursue his inalienable rights
without having any shadows cast upon his dignity through
6
unwarranted discrimination."
The only other reference to human dignity in the
Convention Record appears in Delegate Proposal No. 33, which
states: "The rights of individual dignity, privacy, and free
expression being essential to the well-being of a free society, the
state shall not infringe upon these rights without the showing of
a compelling state interest." 7 Proposal No. 33 was not adopted.
The dignity provision of the Montana Constitution was
modeled largely after a similar provision in the Puerto Rico

1.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.

2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364; In the
Matter of the Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485.
4. MONT. CONST. art II, § 4. See, e.g., Kottel v. State, 2002 MT 278, 312 Mont. 387,
60 P.3d 403; Geil v. Missoula Irrigation Dist., 2002 MT 269, 312 Mont. 320, 59 P.3d 398;
Great Falls Pub. Sch. v. Johnson, 2001 MT 95, 305 Mont. 200, 26 P.3d 734.
5. 5 MONT. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1642 (1972) [hereinafter,
CONVENTION RECORD].

6.

Id.

7.

1 CONVENTION RECORD 127.
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Constitution - the only other constitution in the United States or
its territories that specifically provides for the unconditional
protection of individual dignity.8 Of course, an express right to
human dignity means little when it is unclear what the right
might entail. Webster's Dictionary defines "dignity" as "the
quality or state of being worthy, honored, or esteemed."9
Likewise, "indignity" is defined as "a) an act that offends against
a person's dignity or self-respect; or b) humiliating treatment."'10
In their recent article, Montana legal scholars Matthew Clifford
and Thomas Huff analyze the dignity provision of the Montana
Constitution and determine that, because there was so little
discussion on the concept of dignity at the Constitutional
Convention, the delegates most likely intended "human dignity"
to be interpreted as it is generally understood in the Western
ethical tradition. 1 Based on their historical and philosophical
analysis of the concept of human dignity, Clifford and Huff
associate the concept with "the normative ideal of individual
persons as intrinsically valuable, as having inherent worth as
individuals, at least in part because of their capacity for
12
independent, autonomous, rational, and responsible action."
Human beings have inherent worth resulting from their abilities
to have control over their own lives, and respect for that worth
manifests itself in the form of political rights and fair treatment
13
by governmental authorities.
The Montana Supreme Court finally shed some light on the

8. P.R. CONST. art. II, § I. That provision reads: "The dignity of the human being is
inviolable. All men are equal before the law. No discrimination shall be made on account
of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Both the
laws and the system of public education shall embody these principles of essential
human equality."
The Illinois Constitution includes two references to dignity: 1) a provision for the
respect of the dignity and privacy of crime victims, ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1; and 2) a
provision entitled "Individual Dignity," which condemns hate speech in order to "promote
individual dignity." Id., § 20. The Illinois Appellate Court has interpreted this
constitutional provision as merely a "hortatory" view toward human dignity, and not as
creating a fundamental right. See AIDA v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 772 N.E.2d
953, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
9.

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 354 (9th ed. 1986).

10. Id. at 614.
11. Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and
Scope of the Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible Applications, 61
MONT. L. REV. 301, 314 (2000).

12. Id. at 307.
13. Id.
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issue in May 2003 with the Walker v. State1 4 decision. The court
relied heavily on the dignity provision of the state constitution
in examining the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief.
Walker argued that Montana State Prison's use of behavior
management plans (BMPs) violated his state constitutional
right against cruel and unusual punishment. 15 Walker provided
evidence that inmates were forced to reside in cells coated in
blood, feces and vomit, and were frequently stripped naked and
given only a small blanket for warmth as punishment for
unacceptable behavior. 16 Walker was subjected to a series of
BMPs as penalty for his multiple suicide attempts. 17 Walker
was schizophrenic and suicidal, and the BMPs exacerbated his
mental illness.' 8 He was denied both medication and hot meals,
and the finger-food he was allowed was passed to him through
the same slot as the toilet-cleaning brush.1 9 One inmate in
Walker's cellblock described his daily prison life:
My feeling of worth, you know, was just-I didn't feel worth
anything, you know, I didn't want to--I didn't want to carry on.
When I finally went to the mental health block, I didn't care
whether I lived or died. It's-eating like a dog, eating your food off
the ground, and really, you know, you don't even feel human after
20
a while ....
In his argument concerning cruel and unusual punishment,
Walker cited Madrid v. Gomez 2' for the standard for when
prison punishment violates the inmate's constitutional rights.
The Gomez court held that when the segregation techniques
used are so severe as to cause mental illness or to worsen an
existing mental condition, the prison officials are deemed to
22
have caused "psychological torture."
The Montana Supreme Court held the Montana State
Prison's use of BMPs and the living conditions in Walker's
cellblock constituted cruel and unusual punishment by
worsening his existing mental illness. 23 But the court did not
14.
15.
16.

2003 MT 134, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872.
Id.; see also MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22.
Walker, 23.

17.

Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. 66.
Id. 24.
Id. 79.
889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Walker, 76 (citing Gomez, 889 F. Supp. at 1264).
Id. 84.

17-18.
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end its analysis with Article II, Section 22. Instead it chose to
use the dignity provision for the first time. First, the majority
pointed out that Montanans enjoy broader protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures based on the state
constitution's explicit privacy provision. 24 Likewise, the Court
reasoned, Montanans enjoy broader protection against cruel and
unusual punishment based on the state constitution's explicit
25
dignity provision.
An inmate does not surrender his constitutional rights when
taken into custody. Justice Nelson, writing for the majority,
stated: "When the rights of even the most disrespected among us
are ignored, all of society is diminished. '26 The Court reversed
the denial of Walker's post-conviction relief and remanded the
case to the District Court to enter an order requiring Montana
State Prison to improve its conditions and change its BMP
practices. 27 The Montana Supreme Court also ordered Montana
State Prison to report the status of the improvements to the
28
District Court in 180 days.
The Walker decision demonstrates that a state may,
through its constitution, provide its citizens with additional
rights beyond those provided by the federal Constitution.
Federal Constitutional caselaw sets forth certain rights that
states cannot fail to provide, but states are free to grant rights
above and beyond that federal standard. The Montana Constitution specifically grants its citizens several rights not listed
in the U.S. Constitution, including a right to privacy, 29 a right to
know, 30 and, as stated above, a right to individual dignity. The
inclusion of these rights shows constitutional delegates were not
willing to depend on courts to find these rights implied in other
Constitutional provisions; they were important enough to be
included in strong plain language in the Declaration of Rights.
Individual dignity, however it is defined or interpreted,
essentially concerns the basic worth of human beings simply by
nature of their status as human beings. As a civilized society,
we value human life and the personal autonomy necessary to
make choices about how we conduct our own lives. We recognize
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. 73.
Id.
Id. 83.
Id., 85.
Walker, 85.

29.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.

30.

Id.§9.
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that denial of political rights-such as the right to free speech,
the right to free exercise of religion, and the right to protection
against unreasonable search and seizure-is a denial of the
individual's freedom to determine the nature of his own life and
to maintain his personal integrity. An affront to individual
dignity, then, occurs when a human being is treated as less than
human. Human dignity is nothing more and nothing less than
respect for human life and independence.
III. THE DEATH PENALTY IN MONTANA
Montana statutorily recognizes capital punishment as an
acceptable means of punishment for certain offenses, including
deliberate homicide with aggravating circumstances, aggravated
kidnapping resulting in the death of the victim, and sexual
intercourse without consent if the defendant has a prior
conviction for sexual intercourse without consent. 3 1 Montana
currently lists hanging and lethal injection as suitable methods
of execution. 32 As of January 1, 2004, there were five convicted
inmates sitting on death row in Montana. 33 All were white
males. 34
The State of Montana has executed only seven
35
prisoners since 1930.
Due to the relatively few executions carried out in Montana,
it is difficult to determine whether racial disparities exist in the
application of the death penalty in this state. However, there is
evidence of racial discrimination in Montana's criminal justice
36
system as a whole, particularly as it affects Native Americans.
A recent study published by the Center for Native American
Studies at Montana State University determined that Native
Americans receive harsher sentences than whites for similar
crimes. 37 The study indicated racial discrimination against

31.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2003).

32.

CENTER

FOR

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STUDIES,

LONDON,

THE INTERNATIONAL

SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 248 (William A. Schabas ed., 1997).
33. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A., Winter
2004, at 29, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf
(last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
34.

Id.

35.

HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 23 (1997).

36. Alexandra Witkin-New Holy, American Indian Religious Rights: Inside Montana
Prisons, availableat http://tlc.wtp.net/american-indian-religious-rights.htm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2004).
37. Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/5

6

2004

DEATH
IN MONTANA
Eklund:PENALTY
The Death Penalty
in Montana

Native Americans "can and does seep into every level of the
criminal justice system from the numbers of police arrests,
severity of charges, sentencing, treatment by correction officers,
and parole board decisions." 38
Native Americans make up
roughly 6% of Montana's population, but represent 16% of the
inmate population at Montana State Prison, an all male facility
in Deer Lodge, and 35% of the inmate population at the
Montana Women's Prison in Billings. 39 The statistical evidence
is clear: the number of convictions and incarcerations of Native
Americans in Montana is disproportionate to the Native
American population.
IV. THE DEATH PENALTY AS A VIOLATION OF INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY

A. PsychologicalEffects of Capital Punishment
Forcing someone to live with the knowledge that his death
is fast approaching is inhumane and demeaning psychological
torture. Inmates on death row react to the knowledge of
impending death in a variety of ways; some appear stronger
than others, but all death row inmates suffer mental anguish
and indignity.
In his essay Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty,
Psychiatrist Louis Jolyon West points out that "[elveryone must
die, but only the condemned prisoner is subjected to the terrible
agony of prolonged waiting-sometimes for years, tormented by
hope-to be deliberately slaughtered ....,
Psychiatrists
conducting studies of death row inmates have further called an
individual's knowledge of when and how he will die "possibly the
41
most stressful of all human experiences."
In abolishing capital punishment in California, the
California Supreme Court based much of its decision on the
inherent cruelty of inflicting inmates with such extreme
psychological harm. 42 While the majority's decision in that case

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Louis Jolyon West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 419, 421-22 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M.
Pierce eds., 1976).
41. Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr. & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Death Row
Confinement, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 527 (Hugo Adam Bedau &
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).
42. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
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was based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishment" provision, and not on human dignity per
se, the court alluded to the dehumanizing nature of capital
punishment "from the pronouncement of the judgment of death
through the execution itself. '43 The court relied heavily on the
findings of experts from the psychiatric and medical
communities, who testified that the imposition of a death
sentence and the subsequent waiting period before execution can
be so mentally destructive to the inmate as to constitute
"psychological torture."44
Federal common law has long recognized that conduct need
not be physical in nature to constitute punishment. As early as
1910, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Eighth Amendment's framers must have understood that
cruelty could manifest itself in state-imposed punishments
"other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation."4 5
Later, in Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court held that
expatriation constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 46 The Court held that the
pain of expatriation was cruel despite the absence of physical
brutality because the punishment subjected the condemned "to a
fate of ever-increasing fear and distress" and represented "the
total destruction of the individual's status in organized
society."4 7 According to the Supreme Court, banishment is too
psychologically torturous for a civilized society to tolerate.
While the Trop Court briefly referred to a presumption of
constitutionality of the death penalty in particular instances,
the Court also noted that at the heart of the "cruel and unusual
punishment" provision was "nothing less than the dignity of
man." 48 It can thus be inferred from the Court's reasoning in
Trop and its reliance on social science findings that if a
particular punishment is so psychologically destructive as to
violate the dignity of man, it must be revoked as
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
There are numerous accounts of mental anguish suffered by

43. Id. at 892.
44. Id. at 894.
45. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
46. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
47. Id. at 101.
48. Id. at 100.
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death row inmates. 49 One particularly detailed description
appears in the concurring opinion in DistrictAttorney for Suffolk
District v. Watson. 50 In that case, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court relied heavily on psychology studies in determining the
death penalty was unconstitutional. 51 In his concurrence,
Justice Liacos outlined the psychological trauma one death row
inmate suffered in the years after his death sentence, as
observed by prison officials. 52 The inmate, Henry Arsenault,
was on death row for two years, during which time he became
obsessed with his impending death. 53 His psychosis manifested
itself in uncontrollable sweating, frequent inability to sleep or
eat, unbearable nightmares, uncontrollable urination, and
constant fidgeting. 54 Prison officials ordered a guard to watch
55
him twenty-four hours a day so he would not commit suicide,
and Arsenault suffered the indignity of being constantly
observed in his humiliating condition. Only after a chaplain
gave him his last rites, the executioner tested the current to the
electric chair, and the other prisoners became aware of what
was to take place and began to scream did the lieutenant
governor reduce Arsenault's sentence to life imprisonment-less
than half an hour before the scheduled execution. 56 Arsenault
was so distraught that he was unable to walk, and guards had to
carry him back to his cell. 57 Justice Liacos labeled Arsenault's
condition of "raw terror and unabating stress" as "torture," and
concluded that "this torture was not unique [to Arsenault], but
58
merely one degrading instance in a legacy of degradation."
Perhaps French novelist Albert Camus best described the
extent of the psychological torture a death sentence imposes on
an inmate:
[F]or there to be equivalence, the death penalty would have to
punish a criminal who had warned his victim of the date at which
he would inflict a horrible death on him and who, from that
moment onward, had confined him at his mercy for months. Such

49. See, e.g., JOSEPH B. INGLE, LAST RIGHTS: 13 FATAL ENCOUNTERS WITH THE
STATE'S JUSTICE (1990).

50. 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1289-90 (Mass. 1980).
51. See generally Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274.
52. Id. at 1289-90.
53. Id. at 1290.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1290.
58. Id.
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59
a monster is not encountered in private life.

Our common law has long recognized that punishment need
not be physical to be torturous. The psychological brutality
imposed on a prison inmate who has been sentenced to die is
terrible and unjustified. A society that values human dignity
cannot tolerate state-imposed psychological anguish of the
severity a prisoner experiences when he knows the time and
manner of his impending death.
B. DiscriminatoryApplication of the Death Penalty
While the central concern of this article is with the facial
constitutionality of the death penalty, it is important to point
out the obvious injustices of the practice as it is applied to racial
minorities in the United States. The discriminatory nature of
the death penalty's application throughout the United States
underscores the fact that it is directly contrary to the notion of
human dignity.
The framers of the 1972 Montana Constitution clearly
considered discrimination a violation of human dignity.
Montana's corollary to the Equal Protection Clause directly
follows the express right to human dignity. 60 In particular,
discrimination based on race deprives a person of basic human
dignity, as it defines the person solely on the basis of an
immutable characteristic. Unequal treatment based on race
sends a message to any member of a racial minority that his
worth as a human being is less than that of his white
counterpart, and he can never redeem himself because the
unequal treatment is based on a factor beyond his control.
Thus, racial discrimination goes to the very heart of human
indignity, as it belittles and dehumanizes its victim.
The worst kind of racial discrimination is that carried out
by governmental authorities because citizens look to their
governments to protect them, not to treat them unfairly based
on arbitrary and immutable characteristics such as race or sex.
The ultimate dehumanization occurs when a government
systematically discriminates against a class of its own people
based on factors beyond their control. Such is the case in the

59. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND
DEATH 173, 199 (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books 1995) (1960).
60. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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American system of capital punishment.
In its 1972 Furman v. Georgia decision, the United States
Supreme Court declared all existing death penalty statutes at
the time unconstitutional as violative of the Eighth
61
Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" provision.
There was no majority opinion; each of the nine justices wrote
62
separately, either concurring or dissenting in the outcome.
While Justices Brennan and Marshall based their opinions on
the per se unconstitutionality of capital punishment, 63 each of
the remaining three members of the majority - Justices
Douglas, Stewart and White - based their opinions on the
64
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty.
Justice Douglas described the death penalty laws then in place
as "pregnant with discrimination." 65 Justice Stewart determined
that of those defendants potentially eligible to receive death
66
sentences, only a "capriciously selected random handful"
actually received them.
Justice White found that "no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[capital punishment] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not" 67 existed in the criminal justice system. Justice Marshall
made clear that he partially based his opinion on statistical
findings that the death penalty was discriminatorily imposed on
68
poor black defendants.
Furman v. Georgia imposed a nationwide ban on capital
punishment and reduced the death sentences of nearly 600
inmates across the country to life sentences. 69 Anti-death
penalty advocates across the nation considered Furman the
pinnacle of success following years of legal battles. 70 However,
the celebration would be short-lived, as state legislatures began
redrafting their death penalty laws to address the issues of
arbitrariness that had concerned the Supreme Court. By 1976,
only four years after the Supreme Court's landmark decision,
thirty-five states and the federal government had enacted new

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 257-306, 314-71.
Id. at 240-57, 306-14.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 309-10.
Furman,408 U.S. at 313.
Id. at 364-65.

69.

STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 266 (2002).

70.

Id.
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capital punishment statutes intended to remedy the problems of
71
their earlier laws.
In the early 1980s, three social scientists-David Baldus,
George Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski-began a comprehensive study ("the Baldus Study") of the death penalty's
application in the Georgia criminal justice system. 72 The
scientists studied in detail the treatment of more than 1,000
defendants convicted of homicide over a six-year period in the
state of Georgia. 73 By 1983, the scientists had issued their
preliminary report, in which they concluded that while race of
the defendant was not a conclusive factor in determining
whether a defendant would receive the death penalty, race of
the victim was an extremely relevant factor. 74 Cases involving
white victims were much more likely to result in death
sentences than cases involving black victims. 75 It was this
evidence of racial disparity in death sentencing that death row
inmate Warren McClesky's attorney presented to the United
States Supreme Court in 1986 in McClesky v. Kemp. 76
Defense counsel in McClesky relied heavily on the Baldus
Study in an attempt to demonstrate that despite post-Furman
remedial legislation, race was still a definitive factor in death
penalty sentencing. In the majority opinion, Justice Powell
acknowledged the legitimacy of the Baldus Study77 and held that
despite the lack of evidence that the defendant's race was a
factor in his sentencing, McClesky had standing to assert an
equal protection claim based on the race of homicide victims
because that discrimination subjected McClesky and other
defendants to "an irrational exercise of governmental power."7 8
While the majority recognized the racial discrepancies in
sentencing practices, it found the evidence insufficient to show
the State had a "discriminatory purpose" in its imposition of

71.

Id. at 268.

72. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 101, 134 (1989).

RACIAL

73. David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).

74.

Id. at 731.

75.

Id.

76. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
77. Id. at 291 n.7.
78. Id. at 291-92 n.8.
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capital punishment. 79
Addressing McClesky's Eighth Amendment claim of
arbitrary sentencing, Powell was brief and dismissive, holding
that the Baldus Study did not conclusively prove that race was a
factor in capital sentencing decisions or in McClesky's individual
case, and merely indicated a "risk" of discriminatory practice
based on race.80 According to Justice Powell and the majority,
that risk is constitutionally acceptable, as judicial discretion is a
necessary and fundamental part of our justice system.8 1 Thus,
until social science evidence can prove beyond doubt that: 1) the
race of either defendant or victim is a definitive factor in the
imposition of death sentences, or 2) the government issues death
sentences with a racially discriminatory purpose, the U.S.
Supreme Court will most likely uphold capital punishment as
constitutional. This almost insurmountable standard places a
serious burden on the defendant proving discriminatory intent,
and may be next to impossible in a modern society where
racism, while still destructive, is often quite subtle.
Racial discrimination is still pervasive in the American
system of capital punishment. According to the U.S. General
Accounting Office in its 1990 report "Death Penalty Sentencing,"
the race of murder victims is still a definitive factor in
influencing the likelihood of a particular defendant receiving the
82
death penalty.
In February of 1997, the American Bar Association
recommended a moratorium be placed on capital punishment
until its discriminatory application improved.8 3 In January of
2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan issued a blanket
moratorium on death sentences in Illinois.8 4 He ordered the
formation of the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment, a
committee made up of politicians, attorneys, and private
citizens, which issued its report on April 15, 2002, after two

79. Id. at 297.
80. Id. at 308.
81. Id. at 309-13.
82. U.S. General Accounting Office Report, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research
Indicates Patternof Racial Disparities,Report to Senate and House Committees on the
Judiciary 5 (Feb. 1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatll/140845.pdf (last
visited Mar. 11, 2004).
83. Ed Bond, Lawyers Split Over a Death Penalty Ban, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at
B3.
84. Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2000, at Al.
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labor-intensive years studying the Illinois justice system.8 5
Governor Ryan relied on the findings of the Commission
Study in his January 2003 speech at Northwestern University
College of Law, wherein he addressed the fundamental cruelty
of the death penalty and focused on his responsibility as
Governor to ensure that justice is carried out fairly in his
state.8 6 The Commission's findings of unfairness, evidenced
both by wrongful convictions and by racial disparities in
sentencing, led Governor Ryan to call for an across-the-board
commutation of all death sentences in the State of Illinois.87
Referring to the Illinois system of capital punishment as
"arbitrary and capricious," and therefore "immoral," Ryan
concluded his speech with an appropriate quote from U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun: "I no longer shall
88
tinker with the machinery of death.
Empirical evidence collected by private and public agencies
demonstrates that race continues to be a factor in the imposition
of death sentences. Racial discrimination is a direct deprivation
of the dignity of its victims. The death penalty is an unfair and
racially biased American institution, and is therefore a direct
violation of the dignity provision of the Montana Constitution,
which specifically grants its citizens the right to human dignity
and equal protection under the law.
C. Denial of Bodily Integrity
Bodily integrity is at the very core of human dignity. The
right to make choices about what happens to one's own body is
established in both federal and state law. For example, in
Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Dep't of Health,8 9 the United
States Supreme Court held that a patient has an unequivocal
right to refuse medical treatment. 90 The Court based its holding

85. Commission on Capital Punishment, Report of the Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment (Apr. 15, 2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/
reports/commission-report/summary-recommendations.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
86. Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University College of Law (Jan.
11, 2003) available at http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/ryans-speech.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2004).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
89. 487 U.S. 261 (1990).
90. Id. at 278.
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on the long-held legal tradition of respect for the autonomy of
people to control and possess their own bodies. The Court cited
Justice Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body. .. ."91 The Cruzan court further expressed the necessity
of respect for individual bodily integrity, citing an 1891 case in
which the Court held that "no right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law."92 Citizens do not lose
their fundamental right to bodily integrity when they are
93
convicted and incarcerated.
In United States v. Lanier,94 the Supreme Court found a due
process right to personal bodily integrity and held that it
included the right to be free from "bodily abuse without lawful
justification by a state official." 95 In order for conduct by a state
official to be a violation of a person's due process right, it must
be "of a serious substantial nature that involves physical force,
mental coercion, bodily injury or emotional damage which is
96
shocking to one's conscience."
Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the right to personal dominion over one's own body,
though most frequently in the medical context. In In the Matter
of the Mental Health of KG.F.,97 a case involving effective
assistance of counsel in mental commitment proceedings, the
Montana Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
bodily integrity. 98 The court pointed out that respect for an
individual's bodily integrity is reflected in several state statutes,
including in a patient's right to refuse medication 99 and the right
to be placed in the least restrictive health care environment

91. Id. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(N.Y. 1914)).
92. Id. (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
93. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 958 (6th Cir. 1998); Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d
204, 210 n. 10 (2003).
94. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
95. Id. at 262.
96. Id.
97. 2001 MT 140, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485.
98. Id. 47.
99. Id.; MONT. CODEANN. § 53-21-115(11) (2002).
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suitable to a patient's needs. 10 0
In Armstrong v. State,10 1 the Montana Supreme Court
stressed the importance of a patient's right "to make personal
judgments affecting one's own health and bodily integrity
without government interference."' 10 2
In both KG.F. and
Armstrong, the Court, at least in part, based its finding of the
basic rights concerning bodily integrity on the Dignity Clause of
10 3
the state constitution.
State imposed death sentences represent the ultimate
denial of an individual's fundamental right to determine what
happens to his body. Whether the means of execution consist of
electrocution, poisoning by lethal injection, or hanging, capital
punishment is a complete surrender of the inmate's body to
state authority. The death row inmate no longer has even his
most basic right - the right to exist.
Ensuring effective punishment of criminals who commit the
10 4
severest of crimes is clearly a compelling state interest.
However, execution is not a narrowly-tailored means of
promoting that interest. Life imprisonment without possibility
of parole is an obvious alternative to execution. It is a very
serious punishment for serious crimes, but unlike the death
penalty, it allows the prisoner to retain his individual dignity
and some choice over what happens to his body. The state is not
justified in denying the prisoner his fundamental right of bodily
integrity through execution, as it is not a narrowly-tailored
means to ensure effective punishment of criminals.
D. Dehumanization of Others
When a death row inmate is executed, the State takes his
personal autonomy. His government no longer values him as
human being; he has no inherent worth. This is the very
definition of indignity. Yet it is not only the executed prisoner

100.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-120 (2002).

101. 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364.
102. Id. 72.
103. K.GF., 45; Armstrong, 72.
104. Upon finding a right to be fundamental, the Court will assess whether denial of
that right is constitutional using strict scrutiny analysis. See Gryczan v. State, 283
Mont. 433, 449, 942 P.2d 112, 122 (1997). Under strict scrutiny analysis, a fundamental
right (here, the right to bodily integrity) may only be breached upon finding 1) the
existence of a compelling state interest; and 2) that the means of furthering that interest
are narrowly tailored to promoting the stated interest. Id.
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who is dehumanized. The execution process is inhumane and
brutal to all involved, from the judge or jury imposing the
sentence to the prison guard who carries it out.
As early as the late 1700s, juries felt the enormous guilt
associated with imposing the death penalty on a criminal
defendant. 10 5 In a time when death sentences were mandatory
for capital crimes, juries felt the intense conflict between their
responsibility as a part of the justice system and their
unwillingness to be the impetus for killing a fellow human
being. Law professor James Wilson is quoted as instructing his
Philadelphia classes during this time, "the criminal will
probably be dismissed without prosecution, by those whom he
has injured. If prosecuted and tried, the jury will probably find,
or think they find, some decent ground on which they may be
10 6
justified or, at least, excused in giving a verdict of acquittal."'
Applicable caselaw prohibits methods of execution that go
beyond "the mere extinguishment of life" or that cause "torture
or a lingering death." 10 7 The modern prison system has taken
elaborate steps to ensure that executions are as sterile and
humane as possible, both to the condemned prisoner and to
those involved in the process. Hanging, nearly the exclusive
10 8
method of execution until the middle of the twentieth century,
often resulted in botched executions which had to be repeated.109
It is now nearly obsolete in the United States, replaced by more
efficient and reliable methods, specifically the electric chair and,
more recently, lethal injection. 110 Yet death by electrocution and
poison, contrary to public knowledge, is not always instantaneous or sterile. Despite electric burns to his skin and
involuntary muscle convulsions caused by the 1900 volts of the
electric chair, it took three separate attempts to kill John Evans,
an Alabama death row inmate."' As Raymond Landry was
undergoing lethal injection in Texas, the needle came loose from
his vein and sprayed the poisonous chemicals at the

105.
106.
107.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 101.
Id.
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1084

(1985).

108.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 169.

109.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 46.

110.

Montana, however, still recognizes hanging as a suitable execution method.

CENTER FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STUDIES, LONDON, THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK

ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 248 (William A. Schabas ed., 1997).
111.

INGLE, supra note 49, at 102-03.
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spectators. 112 At the electrocution of Pedro Medina in Florida in
1997, "[b]lue and orange flames up to a foot long shot from the
right side of Mr. Medina's head and flickered for 6 to 10 seconds,
filling the execution chamber with smoke." 113
The American Medical Association prohibits doctors from
taking part in executions, other than administering sedatives
before the killing and performing the autopsy afterward. 1 4
While this policy is clearly necessary to comply with every
doctor's vow to "first do no harm," it leaves the business of lethal
injection to non-medically trained prison officials, who often
spend a painfully long time attempting to find a suitable vein in
which to inject the poison. 115
Such graphic depictions of
mistakes in executions demonstrate that despite technological
advancements, current methods of execution continue, at least
in some cases, to go beyond "the mere extinguishment of life." 116
Psychiatry Professor Louis Jolyon West emphasizes the
inhumanity inflicted upon prison guards forced to carry out
executions in the course of their employment. He writes, "[t]he
killing of a helpless captive is a brutally degrading experience.
If only those who have personally participated in an execution
could vote on the death penalty, I suspect it would be abolished
11 7
permanently."
Prison officials often break down the execution process into
small tasks assigned to separate employees, in order to
minimize the sense of responsibility each person has for the
death of the inmate."18 Several states now use a machine to
inject the poison into the condemned's bloodstream. 1 9 The
machine was designed to operate only upon simultaneous

112.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 297.

113.

Deborah

W. Denno, Execution and the Forgotten Eighth Amendment, in

AMERICAN'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 547, 573 (James R. Acker, et

al. eds.

1998) (quoting Deborah W. Denno,

Getting to Death: Are Executions

Constitutional? 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 361 (1997)).
114. BANNER, supra note 69, at 297.
115.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 297.

116. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Glass v. Louisiana,471 U.S. 1080, 1084
(1985).
117. Louis Jolyon West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 422 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds.,
1976).
118.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 299.

119.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 299.
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depression of two separate buttons, ensuring that one person
never holds full responsibility for the death of the inmate.120
In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,'2 1 Justice
Marshall noted: "American citizens know almost nothing about
capital punishment,"'122 and that if the American public were
better informed about the execution process, "the great mass of
citizens would conclude ...that the death penalty is immoral

and therefore unconstitutional." 123 He refused to believe that "at
this stage in our history, the American people would ever
24
knowingly support purposeless vengeance."'
Attempts to sterilize the execution process and lessen the
burden on officials carrying out the sentences demonstrate the
government's acknowledgement that capital punishment is
dehumanizing not only to the condemned prisoner, but also to
everyone involved in the process, whether they be jurors, judges,
prison officials, or spectators.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
As of 1995, nearly every European nation had discontinued
practice of the death penalty.125 Capital punishment has also
been abolished in non-European countries with cultures similar
to that of the United States: Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada. 26
The United States has been the target of
international criticism for its refusal to follow its sister nations
in abolishing the death penalty. 27
A. The South African Approach
Until the 1990s, South Africa was one of the strongest
supporters of the death penalty in the world, with roughly 100
executions per year. 128 The number of annual executions peaked
120.

BANNER, supra note 69, at 299.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
Id
BANNER, supra note 69, at 300.

126.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

THE DEATH PENALTY: LIST OF ABOLITIONIST AND

RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenaltycountries-eng (last updated Mar. 4, 2004).
127. BANNER, supranote 69, at 301.
128. Michelle M. Sharoni, A Journey of Two Countries: A Comparative Study of the
Death Penalty in Israel and South Africa, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 269
(2001).
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in 1987 at 164, an average of nearly one execution every two
129
days.
In 1988, Amnesty International published a study on the
death penalty in Apartheid South Africa. 130 The results clearly
demonstrated the racism inherent in the South African criminal
justice system. Over a one-year period, 47% of black defendants
convicted of killing whites received death sentences, whereas
only 2.5% of blacks convicted of killing blacks received death
sentences. 13 1 During the same period, no whites convicted of
32
killing blacks received death sentences.1
With the fall of Apartheid in South Africa came a new
criminal justice system, a new constitution and a Constitutional
Court. 133 In 1993, South Africa adopted an Interim
Constitution, 134 dedicated to the fair treatment and protection of
the basic rights of all people of South Africa. The Interim
Constitution was ratified in 1996, and is now the effective
Constitution of South Africa.1 35 It includes a strong Bill of
Rights, including an explicit right to individual dignity, which
reads: "[E]very person shall have the right to respect for and
136
protection of his or her dignity."
The very first opinion issued by the new Constitutional
Court of South Africa concerned the constitutionality of the
death penalty. 137 The Constitutional Court effectively abolished
the death penalty in South Africa in State v. Makwanyane.138 In
a unanimous decision, the Court determined that, based on the
new constitution's enumerated rights to equal protection of the
law, 13 9 life, 140 dignity,' 4 ' and protection against "cruel, inhuman

129.

Id.

130.

Id. at 268.

131.

Id.

132. Id. (quoting South Africa: The Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT'L NEWSLETTER, Feb.
1989, at 6).
133. Id. at 271-72.
134. Dana L. Bogie, Life or Death? The Death Penalty in the Untied States and the New
Republic of South Africa, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229, 234 (1996).
135.

See S. AFRICA CONST., EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM,

available at http://www.

saweb.co.za/election/constit/saconst.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
136. S. AFRICA CONST. ch. 2, § 10.
137. Sharoni, supra note 128, at 274.
138. 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (SA), available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218.
139. S. AFRICA CONST. ch. 2, § 8.
140. Id. ch. 2, § 9.
141.

Id. ch. 2, § 10.
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or degrading treatment or punishment,"' 142 the death penalty
143
was not a constitutional punishment.
The Court began by analyzing the death penalty as it was
then applied in South Africa. The Court determined that chance
was involved "at every stage from arraignment to appeal," and
that death sentences could be "affected by factors such as the
way the case had been investigated or presented, how effectively
the defence had been conducted, the personality of the trial
judge and his attitude towards punishment.... [P]overty, race
and chance played a role in determining who should live or
die." 144 Based on evidence of arbitrary application of the death
penalty, the Court held that the death penalty, as applied,
145
violated the fundamental right to equal protection of the law.
The Court next addressed the per se constitutionality of the
death penalty, holding it violative of the constitutional right to
dignity, as the punishment "strips the convicted person of all
dignity and treats him or her as an object to be eliminated by
the State."1 46 Quoting from Furman v. Georgia, the Court held
that the death penalty is an affront to the notion of human
dignity as it "involves, by its very nature, a denial of the
executed person's humanity."1 47 The Court concluded that if
"the essential content of the right not to be subjected to cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment.., is found to be respect for
life and dignity, . . . the death sentence for murder, if viewed
subjectively from the point of view of the convicted prisoner,
clearly negates the essential content of the right.148 The Court
ordered that the State could not execute any criminal already
1 49
convicted or any citizen in the future.
B. The Western EuropeanApproach
With the exception of Belgium, which is de facto abolitionist
(no one has been executed in Belgium since 1918),150 and Russia,
142. Id. ch. 2, § 11.
143. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (SA), available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218.
144. Makwanyane, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *13.
145. Id. at **13, 364. The right to equal protection is guaranteed under Section 8 of
the Bill of Rights.
146. Makwanyane, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *64.
147. Id. at *63 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
148. Id. at **163-64.
149. Id. at *179.
150.

ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 12 (2d. ed.
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which imposed a moratorium on executions in 1996,151 no
Western European country practices capital punishment. 152 The
abolitionist status of Western Europe is most likely due to the
strong European commitment to protection of human rights. In
1995, eighteen European countries ratified the Sixth Protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights, which specifically
153
condemned the practice of the death penalty.
European nations make a direct connection between
abolishing the death penalty and maintaining human rights. In
response to a United Nations survey, officials in Switzerland
stated that capital punishment was abolished because the death
154
penalty is "a flagrant violation of the right to life and dignity."
Germany, which eliminated the death penalty in 1949 - during a
period of post-war reconstruction and particular sensitivity to
human rights - has been a strong supporter of international
abolition. 155 The German Constitution contains specific provisions granting a right to individual dignity1 56 and prohibiting
capital punishment. 157 Germany's dignity provision appears in
the very first section of the statement of Basic Rights, and reads,
"Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the
15
duty of all state authority."'
Germany has been particularly vocal in its support for the
worldwide abolition of the death penalty. At the United Nations
annual meeting on democratic rights in 1999, Germany targeted
the United States as offending the U.N. campaign for human
rights, declaring the cruelty of "the execution of minors, of the
mentally ill, enforcement before completion of ongoing pro1996).
151. Russia imposed a moratorium upon joining the Council of Europe in 1996.
Russian Parliament Backs Death Penalty, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1823556.stm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). The Russian
parliament recently approved a resolution against abolition of the death penalty, but the
resolution is presently without effect, as a 1999 constitutional court ruled that no
executions could be carried out until all death penalty cases were tried by juries. As of
1999, very few Russian regions conducted jury trials, though they are becoming more
common. Id.
152. HOOD, supra note 150, at 12.
153.

HOOD, supra note 150, at 11.

154.

HOOD, supra note 150, at 14.

155. William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death
Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REV. 733, 741 (1997).
156. GG CONST. art. 1, § 1.
157. Id. art. 102.
158. Id. art. 1.
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cedures, and extradition to countries where the death penalty is
1 59
in force."
The United States Supreme Court has at times considered
evidence from "other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage." 160 In a recent death penalty case, the Court relied in
1 6 in
part on a brief by the European Union as Amicus Curiae
determining the unconstitutionality of death sentences imposed
upon the mentally retarded.1 62 The Court's decision demonstrates a concession that, at least in some circumstances, the
death penalty is inhumane.
Western Europe views the institution of capital punishment
as a violation of human rights. The United States stands alone
among Western democratic nations as the sole nation unwilling
to recognize the connection between the death penalty and the
deprivation of human rights and individual dignity.
VI. CONCLUSION

The state constitution specifically grants Montana citizens a
right to individual dignity. This guarantee is not qualified; it is
an unconditional provision requiring the state to value and
respect human life and refrain from unfair treatment of its
citizens.
The death penalty is clearly an affront to the notion of
human dignity. The psychological pain inflicted on a death row
inmate in the period of months or years before his execution
constitutes humiliating treatment and brutal torture which
should not be tolerated in a civilized society. Empirical evidence
of racial disparities in the imposition of death sentences
demonstrates that the death penalty is applied in an arbitrary,
and thus unconstitutional manner, and therefore violates the
individual's right to equal protection under the law and human
dignity. The death penalty represents the ultimate violation of
the inmate's bodily integrity, denying him the right to make
choices about his own body. Democratic societies across the
world recognize the death penalty as a violation of human rights
and have condemned the practice of capital punishment in the

159. Toni M. Fine, Moratorium 2000: An International Dialogue Toward a Ban on
Capital Punishment, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 421, 436 (1999).
160. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
161. The European Union filed an amicus brief in McCarver v. North Carolina, 531
U.S. 1205 (2001), relied upon in a later case, Atkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
162. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
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United States.
The Montana Constitution provides more rights to Montana
citizens than the U.S. Constitution, and the Montana Supreme
Court is not bound by the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court when interpreting the state constitution. The
time has come to abolish the death penalty in Montana and
renew the dedication to individual dignity and human rights
that was so important to the framers of the 1972 Montana
Constitution.
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